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Conner Schultz: Deliberative Control and Eliminativism about Reasons for Emotions 
(Under the direction of Alex Worsnip) 
 
Some people think that there are normative reasons for emotions. I disagree. In this paper, I argue for 
Strong Eliminativism – the view that there are no reasons for emotions. My argument for this claim 
has two premises: (1) a fact F is a reason for agent A to have (or refrain from having) an attitude X 
only if A can deliberate to (or away from) X at least partly on the basis of F; (2) no one can deliberate 
to any emotion. Taken together, these two premises entail that there are no reasons for emotions. I 
offer three motivations for thinking the first premise is true. My argument for the second premise rests 
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We frequently make normative-sounding claims about emotions. When you get fired, we say ‘you 
should be sad’. When a friend has wronged you, we say ‘your anger is justified’. If your partner is 
needlessly jealous, we say ‘they should not be jealous’ or ‘there’s no reason to be jealous’. If your partner 
cheats on you, a friend might console you with ‘you have all the reason in the world to be upset’. 
Claims like this abound, and they all seem to be in the ballpark of normativity. From these claims, it’s 
natural to infer that we ordinarily think that there are normative reasons to have – or not have – certain 
emotions. Getting fired seems to be a reason to be sad. A friend wronging you seems to be a reason to 
be angry. Your trustworthiness seems to be a reason for your partner to not be jealous. Your partner’s 
infidelity seems to be a reason to be upset. Moreover, these don’t just seem to be explanatory reasons 
why people feel certain emotions, but seem to be normative reasons for having those emotions. By 
situating emotions within the space of reasons, we also seem to open emotions up to all sorts of 
normative evaluations and criticisms, most prominently praise and blame. Since your jealous partner 
has (let’s suppose) most reason, all-things-considered, to not be jealous, your partner is blameworthy 
for their jealousy.  
 These are all compelling thoughts; yet, I will argue, they’re mistaken. That is, I will argue that 
there are no normative reasons for emotions. In my view, normative reasons don’t just favor certain 
actions and attitudes, but play a crucial role in helping us figure out what to do and what attitudes to 





however, peculiar features about emotions that distance them from other attitudes, like belief and 
intention. Emotions seem to be recalcitrant in the face of judgments and deliberations in ways that 
beliefs and intentions are not: emotions sometimes seem to persist even after we’ve made conscious 
judgments that conflict with them. This peculiar feature of emotions, I’ll argue, highlights one 
important respect in which emotions seem to be outside of our rational agency: emotions are not under 
our deliberative control. Given this and the tight connection between reasons and deliberation, I 
maintain that there are no reasons for emotions. 
 Barry Maguire (2018) has recently argued for the similar thesis that there are no reasons for 
affective attitudes (which are commonly understood as including emotions). My argument against 
reasons for emotions is notably different than Maguire’s. Maguire’s main contention is that facts which 
make affective attitudes fitting aren’t gradable, and therefore can’t count as reasons. I agree with 
Maguire that there are facts which make emotions fitting; however, my argument doesn’t appeal to 
gradeability, but rather to the fact that it’s not possible to deliberate to emotions on the basis of these 
fittingness-facts. (Indeed, while Maguire’s ultimate project1 is to argue for a value-first picture of 
reasons over competing, fittingness-first pictures, I’ll later show that my view is compatible with some 
fittingness-first pictures of reasons.) 
The thesis I’ll be arguing for in this paper is what I call ‘Strong Eliminativism about Reasons 
for Emotion’ – or ‘Strong Eliminativism’ for short: 
 
STRONG ELIMINATIVISM: There are no reasons for emotions. 
 
 





The reasons I’m interested in are distinctly normative reasons, as opposed to explanatory, causal, or 
motivating reasons. Though notoriously difficult to characterize, I’ll offer a few brief, fairly non-
committal remarks regarding normative reasons (henceforth just ‘reasons’). Reasons for Φ-ing are the 
sorts of facts or considerations that count in favor of Φ-ing. If there are sufficiently strong reasons for 
you to Φ, then you should Φ. There are reasons for some types of things, but not for others. Most 
well-known, there are reasons for belief and reasons for action. Belief is an attitude. There are also 
reasons for other types of attitudes. Intentions are attitudes, and there are reasons for intention.2 
Attitudes, however, encompass a broad range of other mental states, such as desires and emotions. For 
any class of attitudes, we can ask whether there are reasons for attitudes of this class. The deliberative 
constraint, discussed at length in §1, is a constraint on reasons for attitudes.  
As mentioned above, there are reasons for some things, but not for others. Among the things 
we uncontroversially don’t have reasons for are states like headaches or indigestion. We might have 
reasons to take steps to prevent or soothe headaches and indigestion, but headaches and indigestion 
simply aren’t the sorts of things we can have reasons for or against. In fact, as will be shown in §1, 
focusing on why there aren’t reasons for headaches and indigestion elucidates important features of 
normative reasons.  
My argument for Strong Eliminativism is a straightforward one, with two premises: 
 
2 It’s an interesting question what the relationship is between reasons for action and reasons for intention. My view is that 
these are not two distinct sets of reasons. Rather, I think that reasons for action are fundamentally best understood in terms 
of reasons for intention. This analysis, I think, yields attractive results. It seems bizarre to ask questions like, ‘I get that I 
should go to the store, but should I intend to go to the store?’ or ‘I get that I have all-things-reason to go to the store, but 
do I have all-things-considered reason to intend to go to the store?’. One way to understand why this is a bizarre question 
is that the reasons for the action just are reasons for the corresponding intention. We can ask ourselves the question ‘should 
I Φ?’ and ‘should I intend to Φ’, and if the answers are yes, both questions should simply issue in an intention to Φ. This 
suggests that we should view reasons for action just as reasons for intention. As will be shown later on, the deliberative 
constraint is a constraint on reasons for attitudes. But even if one thinks that reasons for action aren’t reasons for intentions, 
or that reasons for intention should be understood in terms of reasons for action, I believe that there’s a close cousin of the 






1. A fact F is a reason for agent A to have (or refrain from having) an attitude X only 
if A can deliberate to (or away from) X at least partly on the basis of F. 
2. No one can deliberate to any emotion. 
\ Therefore, there are no reasons for emotions. 
 
I will discuss each premise in §1 and §2, respectively. The first premise is what I call the ‘deliberative 
constraint’. The intuitive idea behind this constraint is just that reasons for an attitude must be able 
to feature in our deliberation to that attitude. 
 The intuitive idea of the second premise is that emotions aren’t the sorts of things that we can 
deliberate to. Deliberation, as I conceive of it, is a matter of settling a question, and settling a question 
consists in forming attitudes (or refraining from forming them). But, I will argue in §2 that there are 
no questions such that settling them consists in forming an emotion. My argument for this claim rests 
on the aforementioned recalcitrance of certain emotions: emotions can still be recalcitrant even after 
all the relevant deliberative questions are settled. 
The two premises taken together entail that there aren’t reasons for emotions, i.e. that Strong 
Eliminativism is true. It should be appreciated at the outset that this is a striking and perhaps radical 
conclusion. My conclusion is that emotions are, so to speak, outside the scope of normativity, provided 
that normativity is understood as being fundamentally concerned with normative reasons. Moreover, 
no matter how the scope of normativity is understood, my view suggests that emotions are more like 





though emotions are attitudes, with respect to normative reasons they are more like non-attitudinal 
states (like headaches and indigestion) than they are like many other attitudes.  
 
§1   Premise 1: The Deliberative Constraint 
 
The purpose of this section is to develop and defend the first premise of my argument, the deliberative 
constraint. Before discussing the deliberative constraint, let me first explain what I mean by 
‘deliberation’.  
Deliberation – or reasoning – is an integral feature of our normative lives.3 Nonetheless, it’s 
tough to pin down exactly what deliberation is, because it includes a broad cluster of thought processes. 
I tentatively suggest we think of deliberation as the cluster of thought processes concerned with settling 
a question.4 I’ll refer to the question being settled as the ‘deliberative question’. Deliberation is 
successfully concluded just in case the question is settled one way or another. Settling a question 
paradigmatically consists in forming an attitude. But settling a question also sometimes consists in 
either giving up an attitude or refraining from having an attitude. This point will become important 
when we consider emotions in §2, since many cases of emotions and deliberation seem to be cases 
where we’re trying to give up certain emotions. It should be observed that refraining from having an 
attitude isn’t the mere lack or absence of an attitude; rather, refraining from having an attitude is itself 
a kind of stance. Indeed, what’s common to forming an attitude, giving up an attitude, and refraining 
 
3 Sometimes philosophers use ‘deliberation’ and ‘reasoning’ differently. Some philosophers think reasoning concerns 
transitioning from a set of attitudes to some new attitude according to a rule (e.g. modus ponens), whereas deliberation  
denotes a broader class of thought processes that need not be rule-governed in this way (e.g. weighing pros and cons). I’ll 
use these terms synonymously.  
 





from having an attitude is that they seem to involve an agent in some kind of attitudinal stance. For 
simplicity, I’ll often just talk about cases where settling a question consists in forming an attitude, but 
everything I say can be generalized to cases that involve either giving up or refraining from having an 
attitude. Given that refraining from having an attitude is a kind of attitudinal stance, let the term 
‘attitude’ also include such stances. 
I’ll sometimes refer to attitudes that themselves settle a question – that is, attitudes that are 
such that settling a question itself consists in forming these attitudes – as the ‘direct results’ of 
deliberation. By contrast, when an attitude merely causally follows from deliberation, without the 
settling of the relevant question itself consisting in forming the attitude in question, I’ll call it an  
‘indirect result’ of deliberation. 
There are two particularly well-known types of deliberation: doxastic and practical. Doxastic 
deliberation is concerned with the deliberative question whether P. Settling the question whether P 
consists in forming a doxastic attitude toward P. If one settles the question by judging that P, one 
thereby comes to believe that P. If one settles the question by judging that not-P, one thereby comes 
to believe that not-P.5 Practical deliberation is concerned with a broad cluster of deliberative questions. 
These include: whether to Φ, when to Φ, how to Φ, what to do, and so on. Some of these questions 
admit of a greater range of possible answers than others (e.g. what to do this afternoon is particularly 
 
5 It’s less clear what to say in the case of suspension of judgment, because, strictly speaking, suspending judgment about 
whether P doesn’t settle the question whether P. There are a few ways we could handle suspension of judgment. One option 
is to broaden the notion of settling so that the range of permissive answers to whether P includes a kind of committed 
neutrality about whether P. This is a plausible suggestion: suspending judgment about whether P settles the question 
insofar as it’s an attitude one takes regarding the state of play with respect to the (other) answers to the question. This 
makes suspending judgment notably different than, say, refusing to answer the question. A second option is to say that 
suspending judgment doesn’t settle the question whether P, but rather settles some related higher-order question – say, 
whether I should believe P or whether my evidence decisively favors P. A third option is to think that suspension of judgment 
is more like a transitional state while one is still inquiring (Friedman, 2017), and thus by definition does not settle the 
question one is inquiring about. A consequence of this way is that, given the deliberative constraint, there aren’t reasons 
for suspending judgment, unless we can reduce them to reasons for of some other state that we can deliberate to – for 





open-ended), but all of them are alike in that settling them consists in the formation of an intention. 
For simplicity, I’ll focus on the special, narrow question whether to Φ. Settling the question whether 
to Φ consists in coming to either the decision to Φ or the decision not to Φ. If one decides to Φ, one 
thereby comes to intend to Φ. If one decides not to Φ, one thereby comes to intend not to Φ.  
 At this venture, it’ll be helpful to introduce some technical terminology to mark some 
distinctions that may not be tracked in ordinary language. I will often speak of deliberating ‘to’ an 
attitude. Deliberating to an attitude is a matter of having settled a deliberative question by forming an 
attitude in question. This is best illustrated by example. One deliberates to a belief that P when one 
settles the question of whether P by forming a belief that P. Deliberating to a disbelief that P involves 
the same deliberative question as deliberating to a belief that P, but differs only with respect to the 
particular attitude one has formed in settling this question. ‘Deliberating to A’ is a success-term, insofar 
as it consists in one’s actually forming the relevant attitude A. I’ll also sometimes speak of deliberation 
‘away from’ an attitude, whereby one antecedently holds an attitude, and then deliberates to giving up 
this attitude – as is the case when one deliberates away from belief that P to either disbelief that P or 
suspension of judgment about whether P.  
There are, however, additional deliberative questions that bear on attitudes, but whereby 
settling these other questions need not issue in those same attitudes. For instance, aside from the 
deliberative question whether P, there are also the deliberative questions whether belief that P is valuable 
and whether belief that P is rational. In either case, we would not say that in settling the question, one 
thereby deliberates to a belief that P, because the deliberative question is not whether P. Rather, one 
would be deliberating to a belief that P is valuable or that P is rational. I will use the term deliberating 





not to) some attitude A, in my sense, just in case (a) the deliberative question bears on A in some way, 
but (b) settling this question doesn’t consist in forming A, but rather in forming some other related 
attitude.6 In both of the examples just given, one is deliberating about the belief that P, but one isn’t 
deliberating to the belief that P, because settling neither question consists in a belief that P.  
Sometimes deliberating about an attitude can indirectly result in this attitude. If I deliberate to 
the belief that belief that P is rational, then, if I go on to form the belief that P on the basis of this 
higher-order belief, the belief that P is the indirect result of my original deliberation. Similarly, if I 
deliberate to an intention to believe that P (or to get myself to do so), and if this results in actions that 
ultimately end in a belief that P, this belief is an indirect result of my original deliberation. I’ll argue 
in §2 that, to whatever extent emotions ever result from deliberation, they only do so indirectly. 
 
1.1   Precisifying the Deliberative Constraint 
 
With that said, let’s move on to the deliberative constraint:  
 
DELIBERATIVE CONSTRAINT: A fact F is a reason for agent A to have (or refrain from having) 
an attitude X only if A can deliberate to (or away from) X at least partly on the basis of F. 
 
There are five features of the deliberative constraint that require clarification.  
 
6 We should understand ‘bears on’ broadly; a deliberative question need not explicitly refer to an attitude for it to count as 






First, the deliberative constraint is a necessary condition on normative reasons: it is a necessary 
condition on a fact’s being a reason that it can feature in deliberation.7 This contrasts with any thesis 
about the constitution of reasons. Theses about the constitution of reasons concern what reasons 
fundamentally are, or what, if anything, reasons-facts can be explained in terms of. These come in 
many stripes, and I’ll quickly give a few examples. First, reasons primitivism, famously offered by Parfit 
(2011) and Scanlon (2014): reasons-facts cannot be explained in terms of any other facts. Second, 
fittingness-first views, argued for by McHugh & Way (2016) and Howard (2019): reasons-facts are 
explained in terms of fittingness-facts. Third, value-first views, argued for by Maguire (2016): reasons-
facts are explained in terms of value-facts. Fourth, and finally, the reasoning-first view, defended by 
Way (2017) and Setiya (2014): reasons-facts are explained in terms of reasoning-facts – i.e. the fact 
that F is a reason to Φ is explained in terms of the fact that F can be a premise of good reasoning about 
whether to Φ.8 
At first glance, the deliberative constraint looks similar to the reasoning-first view, but these 
should be differentiated. The deliberative constraint is logically weaker than the reasoning-first view 
in two respects. First, reasoning-first views are committed to the following biconditional: F is a reason 
to Φ iff F can be a premise of good reasoning about whether to Φ. By contrast, the deliberative 
constraint is only committed to a one-way conditional, i.e. the left-to-right direction of this 
 
7 I will remain neutral on how exactly to understand this necessary connection – i.e. on whether this is a conceptual or 
metaphysical connection. 
8 It’s not entirely clear whether Way (2017) endorses the reasoning-first view; rather, he just seems to defend it from one 






biconditional.9 Second, reasoning-first views make the metaphysical claim that reasoning-facts explain 
reasons-facts, whereas the deliberative constraint makes no such claim.10 
The second feature of the deliberative constraint is that it is agent-specific.11 For F to be a reason 
for agent A, F must be able to feature in A’s deliberation. A non-agent-specific version of the deliberative 
constraint would be something like: fact F is a reason for an attitude X only if it’s possible to deliberate 
to X on the basis of F. On this view, F just needs to be able to feature in someone’s deliberation to X – 
say, an ideal agent. On my preferred agent-specific formulation, if some fact can feature in your but 
not my deliberation to X, then this fact cannot be a reason for me, though it could be for you. But on 
the non-agent-specific formulation, this same fact could be a reason for both of us, since it can feature 
in your deliberation to X. 
The third feature of the deliberative constraint is that it makes reference to deliberating to X. 
The deliberative constraint thereby entails that we can have reasons only for attitudes that we can 
deliberate to. We might not be able to deliberate to all attitudes, in which case the deliberative 
constraint entails that there aren’t reasons for such attitudes. Indeed, importantly, this means that 
there aren’t reasons for entire classes of attitudes just in case these classes are not attitudes we can 
deliberate to.  
 
9 Schmidt (2020) argues against reasoning-first views. Her objections target the right-to-left direction of this biconditional, 
so they pose no problems for the deliberative constraint. 
 
10 Different reasoning-first views spell out this metaphysical explanation in different ways. This explanation might be 
underwritten by identity (reasons are premises of good deliberation), constitution (reasoning-facts constitute reasons-facts), 
and grounding (reasoning-facts ground reasons-facts). Way (2017) operates with an identity relation. 
11 It should be remarked that a non-agent-specific version of the deliberative constraint would still work for my argument 
for Strong Eliminativism. However, I endorse agent-specificity, and the second and third motivations for the deliberative 






The fourth feature of the deliberative constraint is the notion ‘on the basis of F’. To understand 
this, let’s differentiate between different kinds of reasons-talk. We can talk about reasons that there are 
to Φ, reasons that one has to Φ, and reasons for which one Φs. Φ-ing on the basis of F amounts to F 
being a reason for which one Φs.12 As I understand it, deliberating to an attitude X ‘on the basis of F’ 
just means that, in the course of considering F in one’s deliberation, F is the reason for which one X’s. 
The deliberative constraint is therefore a particular version of a more general view – the view that one’s 
normative reasons for Φ-ing must also be capable of being the reasons for which one Φs. 
 The fifth and final feature to observe is the use of the modal ‘can’. Precisifying the modality of 
this is no easy task, but I’ll offer just a few indications of what I have in mind. To say that one can 
deliberate is to say that one has the ability to deliberate. The notion of ability itself is by no means 
precise, so let’s rule out some of the things I don’t have in mind by ‘ability’. A lot of things might 
stand in one’s way of actually deliberating. One might be too stressed out, too depressed, not have 
enough time, fascinated with a flashing light, and so on. These sorts of opportunity costs aren’t the 
sorts of obstacles I have in mind as constituting an inability to deliberate. Furthermore, one’s desires 
might not cooperate. One might also just not want to deliberate at all, or one might not have the right 
desiderative profile to be moved by the relevant considerations whenever one deliberates. 
Uncooperative desires are also not the sorts of obstacle I have in mind as constituting an inability to 
deliberate. Indeed, as I’ll argue, opportunity costs and uncooperative desires are not the sorts of 
obstacles standing in the way of our deliberating to emotions. We should, however, keep some facts 
about the agent constant, because the deliberative constraint is agent-specific. Among the facts we 
 
12 The reason for which one Φs is sometimes called a ‘motivating’ reason. I’ll avoid using this term for two reasons. First, 
it’s mostly associated with reasons for action and doesn’t translate to reasons for belief as nicely. Second, the term lends 
itself to some confusion. The term sometimes evokes desires (i.e. a ‘motivational set’), and I’m making no claim to the 





should keep constant are facts about the agent’s past experiences and some psychological facts (their 
memories, perceptions, beliefs), whereas among the facts we can idealize are facts concerning 
opportunity costs and desires. I’ll now consider three motivations for the deliberative constraint.  
 
1.2   Three Motivations for the Deliberative Constraint 
 
1.2.1   The Reasons-Reasoning Platitude 
 
The first motivation for the deliberative constraint starts from what I call the ‘reasons-reasoning 
platitude’: we often reason using reasons. Reasons can, and often do, not just feature in our 
deliberation, but serve as the basis from which we deliberate. Consider a case of doxastic deliberation. 
I ask myself the question whether Donald Trump will start his own media company. In trying to answer 
this question – in deliberating – I consider the relevant reasons that I’m aware of – he’s banned from 
most social media sites, he has a personal brand that’d lend itself well to a media company, he’s 
mismanaged his money, and so on – and use these to answer the question. From this, I might conclude 
that he will start a media company, or conclude that he won’t, or suspend judgment. Now consider 
practical deliberation. I ask myself the question whether to go to the store. In deliberating, I consider 
the relevant reasons – that my food stock is low, that the grocery store is open, that I’m hungry – and 
use these to determine whether to go to the store. In both cases – in doxastic and practical deliberation 
– the reasons that I consider are an integral part of my deliberations, and the outcomes of my 
deliberation (a belief or an intention, respectively) are based on the reasons I consider. If I decide to go 





I consider. Similarly, if I believe that Trump will start a media company, I do so based on the relevant 
evidence I considered.  
What explains this platitude? Why is it that reasons can, and so often do, feature in our 
deliberation? It strikes me as obvious that reasons and reasoning are deeply connected; this is reflected 
both in the words themselves and in our reasoning practices, in which we consider reasons. What, 
then, is the connection between reasons and reasoning? The deliberative constraint captures this 
platitude by claiming that the connection between reasons and reasoning is necessary. Reasons can 
feature in our deliberation, because they must be able to. If a would-be reason can’t feature in 
deliberation, then it isn’t a reason after all. There are, however, competing explanations of the reasons-
reasoning platitude. Another way to explain the platitude is that we’re often consciously aware of our 
reasons – and, indeed, aware of our reasons as reasons – and because of this, reasons so often feature 
in our deliberation. While the reasons-reasoning platitude is a good prima facie motivation for the 
deliberative constraint, I’ll now offer two further motivations to support it.  
 
1.2.2   The Explanatory Dimension of Reasons 
 
The second motivation for the deliberative constraint is that it captures important connections 
between reasons and responding to reasons. Kolodny (2005) calls this the ‘explanatory dimension’ of 
reasons. His concern is reasons for action, but his remarks generalize to reasons more broadly. Applied 
to reasons for action, the idea behind the explanatory dimension of reasons is that “if certain facts are 
claimed to provide normative reasons, it must be true that ‘people sometimes act for those reasons’”.13 
 






The deliberative constraint explains how it is that people can act (or adopt some attitude) for their 
reasons: “the reason is the sort of consideration on the basis of which a person in his situation might 
reason to X-ing”.14 Kolodny calls this the ‘kernel of truth’ in Williams’s (1981) ban on external reasons. 
The deliberative constraint yields predictable and appealing results along the explanatory 
dimension of reasons. We ordinarily think there aren’t reasons for perceptions, and the deliberative 
constraint explains this because we can’t reason to perceptions. Similarly, we don’t ordinarily think 
that there are reasons for states like headaches. That headaches are painful isn’t a reason against a 
headache, but is instead a reason for preventing a headache, i.e. a reason for an action rather than for 
the state of a headache. The deliberative constraint predicts this result: we can’t deliberate to or away 
from a headache, but we can deliberate to the actions required to prevent or soothe a headache.15 
Kolodny considers the example of the state of having flat feet. The fact that flat feet will keep one from 
being drafted isn’t a reason to have flat feet, precisely because this isn’t a state we can deliberate to.16 
In all these cases, there’s a relevant sense in which all these states are not ‘up to us’, and we can’t have 
reasons for things that aren’t up to us in some relevant sense. By contrast, there is a relevant sense in 
which action, belief, and desire are up to us. As Kolodny helpfully points out, that these are to us 
doesn’t mean that we have voluntary control over these. Rather, “the sense in which acting, believing, 
and desiring are ‘up to me’ is that I can come to act, believe, and desire on the basis of recognizing 
reasons for acting, believing, and desiring, in such a way that I thereby count as reasoning”.17,18 The 
 
14 Kolodny, 2005, p. 549.  
15 Or, more accurately, to the intentions to the relevant actions.  
 
16 Kolodny, 2005, p. 549. 
 
17 Kolodny, 2005, p. 550. 
 
18 Kolodny uses this point to argue that considerations of coherence aren’t reasons. Similarly, Shah (2006) uses this point 





point here is that the reasons for which we act, believe, desire, and so forth, are also reasons that we 
can recognize and think about in a way that counts as reasoning. Moreover, while I’ll say more about 
blame below, we shouldn’t blame someone for having flat feet. Rather, we should only blame people 
for things that are up to them in some relevant sense – i.e. for things they’re responsible for. The 
deliberative constraint pairs well with a plausible view of responsibility, according to which one is 
responsible only for things under one’s deliberative control. 
 
1.2.3   The Functions of Reasons in Normative Practices 
 
The reasons-reasoning platitude, discussed in §1.2.1, illustrates one of the functions of normative 
reasons in our normative practices: namely, reasons help us figure out what we should do by featuring 
in our deliberation. Now, of course, sometimes we do what we ought to do without having deliberated, 
and sometimes when we do so, we are correctly responding to our reasons (I say more about this 
below). But deliberation is a more mature part of our normative lives: it’s a reflective thought process 
that allows us to take a step back and evaluate what we should do. This mature, reflective part of our 
normative lives is integral to our normative practices, not least because sometimes it’s not at all clear 
what we should do. Deliberation helps us evaluate our various reasons and make informed judgments 
and decisions that, hopefully, align our judgments and decisions more closely with what we in fact 
ought to do.19 
 
to a belief on the basis of pragmatic, non-truth-related considerations. By contrast, my argument for Strong Eliminativism, 
as will be shown, is notably different: whereas Kolodny and Shah argue that certain types of considerations can’t be reasons 
for a relevant attitude, I argue that a certain kind of attitude – namely, emotion – cannot be deliberated to on the basis of 
any consideration, and thus that there are no reasons for attitudes of this kind. 
19 A closely related, but distinct, function seems to be that reasons sometimes help us retrospectively justify our attitudes we 
already have or actions we already performed. But there are complications with this function. If retrospective justification 





 Reasons serve a variety of other interrelated functions in our normative practices. My claim is 
that “reasons” we can’t deliberate with – which I’ll refer to as ‘would-be reasons’ – have no use in any 
of our normative practices. My argument for this claim proceeds by elimination of possible candidate 
roles that would-be reasons might play; that is, I’ll look at various functions of reasons and argue that 
such would-be reasons can’t play these roles. We can differentiate the functions of reasons into three 
categories: first-personal, interpersonal, and third-personal. Simply put, first-personal functions are 
functions individuals themselves can put to use, interpersonal functions are the functions in social 
contexts between people, and third-personal functions are functions we can apply to situations as 
outsiders looking into the situation. I’ll argue that would-be reasons can’t play any of these functions. 
In fact, I’ve already covered the case of first-personal functions: per the reasons-reasoning platitude, 
the first-personal function of reasons is to help us figure out what to do, and by definition, would-be 
reasons can’t play this role, since they can’t feature in deliberation.  
Similarly, I think would-be reasons have no interpersonal use. The interpersonal parts of our 
normative lives include things like (a) supplying one another with reasons, and (b) attributions of 
praise and blame.20 Let’s consider (a). I supply you with reasons precisely so that you can consider 
those reasons in your deliberation, with the hope that this will impart some rational influence on your 
judgments and decisions. Again, would-be reasons can’t play this role.21 
 
these reasons were not the reasons for which we acted or formed the attitude – then this practice amounts to something 
like ‘rationalization’ in the pejorative sense. Insofar as this is part of our normative practices, this is not a good practice, 
and it should not center our normative theorizing. Alternatively, if retrospective justification amounts to something like 
introspecting on the reasons for which we acted or formed the relevant attitude, then, as I’ll argue below, these reasons are 
also reasons we can deliberate with. That is, the function reasons play in retrospective justification (in this latter, legitimate 
sense) supports the deliberative constraint.  
20 Attributions of praise and blame are both inter- and third-personal. I’ll return to their third-personal uses below. 
 
21 One might think that, sometimes, we supply one another with a reason without the hope or expectation that they use it 
in their deliberation, but instead hope that bringing the reason up imparts some causal influence. For instance, if X thinks 
there are pragmatic reasons for belief, X might tell Y some pragmatic reason R for believing P. But (it seems) pragmatic 





Now consider (b). Praise is a rather tricky concept. We sometimes praise people for things 
outside their control – e.g. for being beautiful. We also sometimes praise inanimate objects – e.g. a 
painting for being beautiful. Notably, this is so even though we wouldn’t blame people or things for 
lacking these qualities: we don’t blame people for not being beautiful, nor do we blame paintings for 
being ugly (though sometimes we criticize people and things on these bases). However, the type of 
praise involved in these kinds of cases is different from the distinctly normative kind of praise that we 
engage in when someone is praiseworthy in the sense that, roughly, one has done something good for 
the right reasons. We can call this latter type of praiseworthiness ‘creditworthiness’.22 Creditworthiness 
is the type of praiseworthiness I’ll focus on. Blame, as I understand it, corresponds to this type of 
praise: we blame people for doing the wrong thing, and even sometimes for doing a good thing but 
for the wrong reasons.  
When we praise someone (in the sense tied up with creditworthiness), we’re praising them for 
responding to the right reasons. Responding to reasons isn’t just acting in the way prescribed by those 
reasons. That is, roughly, it involves not just happening to act in those ways, but acting for the reasons 
that support doing so. 
I think that all reasons we can respond to are reasons that we at least could deliberate with. 
Deliberation is one way that we respond to our reasons. In our deliberation, we consider the relevant 
reasons and act on their basis. Other times, though, we respond to our reasons without deliberating. 
There are cases where one’s response is counterfactually sensitive to the presence or absence of the 
 
P on non-rational grounds. In response to this sort of case, I’m inclined to think this isn’t part of our normative practices, 
since we’re seeking to influence people on non-rational grounds. But even so, I’m also inclined to think that R can be used 
in deliberation, just not to deliberation to the belief that P. Rather, R can be used in deliberation to the belief that belief 
that P is pragmatic. This way of handling pragmatic reasons for belief shares affinity with Hieronymi’s (2005) account of 
wrong-kind reasons as bearing on different questions.  





relevant reasons, even though one may not deliberate at all. Plausibly, one’s sensitivity to the presence 
of the relevant reasons constitutes a kind of responsiveness. Moreover, in these cases, were one (or 
one’s suitably idealized counterpart) to introspect, one would be able to identify the relevant reasons 
in the explanation of one’s response.23, 24 Importantly, if one is able to introspect and identify the 
relevant reasons, then one could’ve deliberated with these reasons. To illustrate, suppose I intend to 
meet my friend for lunch on time, and I didn’t reach this intention via deliberation. Furthermore, 
suppose I so intend on the basis of the fact that it’s nice to meet one’s friends on time. It seems plausible 
that, were I to introspect, I’d be able to identify this fact as the reason for which I intend, and 
correspondingly, had I deliberated to this intention, this fact could have featured in my deliberation. 
I suspect this generalizes to all reasons, because the explanation will be the same: the same reasons that 
we identify in introspection seem to be equally available for us to use in our deliberation to support 
and come to adopt certain attitudes and make decisions. Our deliberative capacities don’t seem far 
removed from our introspective capacities, and provided we have both capacities, the same resources 
seem equally available to both. So, I think all reasons that one can respond to seem to be reasons that 
one can deliberate with. I therefore think that attributions of praise are appropriate only when one 
acts in ways prescribed by reasons they can deliberate with. Otherwise, we can’t be praising them for 
responding to the reasons at all. 
This applies equally to blame. It’d be inappropriate, and even unfair, to blame someone for 
not responding to mere would-be reasons. Indeed, if all would-be reasons are – as just argued – reasons 
 
23 Thank you to Jim Pryor for making this point to me. 
 
24 In similar cases, one might not be inquiring into the reasons for which one acted, but seeking the reasons that presently 
strike one as good reasons. This process seems a lot more like retrospective justification (in the sense of rationalization) 





that one couldn’t respond to, then in blaming someone for failing to respond to would-be reasons, 
we’d be blaming someone for not responding to reasons they couldn’t respond to. If someone acts (or 
thinks, or feels) in the ways prescribed by such would-be reasons, it seems like we can at best either (a) 
praise/criticize their instincts (though this praise or criticism would not be of the kind tied to 
creditworthiness), or (b) evaluate the outcome of their acting (or thinking, or feeling) as good or bad. 
Neither of these evaluations amounts to the kind of robust, credit-based praise and blame that we 
engage in when people succeed or fail in responding to their reasons.  
Moreover, just as one of our interpersonal normative practices is supplying one another with 
reasons, I’m inclined to think that one of the functions of blame in particular is to tell people that they 
failed to consider or seek out the relevant reasons that bore on their action (or belief, or attitude). This 
part of the practice of blame wouldn’t make much sense if such reasons couldn’t have featured in the 
agent’s deliberation. Therefore, it seems clear to me that would-be reasons have no interpersonal use. 
Would-be reasons are of help in neither the business of supplying one another with reasons to consider, 
nor the business of praise and blame. 
The only remaining option for the use of would-be reasons is third-personal use. But once 
again, I can’t think of any good third-personal uses of would-be reasons. The third-personal parts of 
our normative practices include evaluations of certain people and/or situations. Among such 
evaluations, it seems like a lot of what we’re concerned with is attributions of praise and blame. But 
just as these would-be reasons don’t help us make attributions of praise/blame in the interpersonal 
case, nor do they help in the third-personal case. If in the interpersonal case we can’t blame someone 
for failing to respond to reasons they couldn’t deliberate with, then nor can we do so in the third-





Of course, attributing praise and blame are not the only third-personal evaluations we might 
be after. We might be trying to evaluate whether someone is being rational. However, the same 
considerations I gave against attributing praise and blame seem to apply equally to attributions of 
rationality. Rationality (in its substantive, rather than structural sense) is a matter of reasons-
responsiveness.25 As illustrated above, all reasons one can respond to are reasons one can deliberate 
with; thus, would-be reasons are of no help in attributions of rationality, because it seems inappropriate 
to brand someone as irrational for failing to respond to a reason that they couldn’t have responded 
to.26 Another sort of evaluation involves judging whether someone acted as they ought to have. These 
sorts of evaluations often go together with evaluations of praise and blame, in which case, the same 
considerations about praise and blame apply equally here. Other times, evaluations of whether 
someone acted as they ought to aren’t wrapped up in evaluations of praise/blame. But in these cases, 
I’m inclined to think this sort of evaluation isn’t concerned with normative reasons. Rather, we’re 
concerned with whether an outcome is good or bad. Indeed, evaluations of situations and actions as 
good or bad are another category of evaluations, and would-be reasons might be relevant here, but not 
as normative reasons. Rather, they’re just considerations that help us figure out whether a situation is 
good or bad. Thus, in short, it seems clear to me that there is no normatively relevant third-personal 
use of would-be reasons.  
We have seen there do not seem to be any first-personal, interpersonal, or third-personal uses 
that would-be reasons could be put to. However, it might be objected that the lack of identifiable uses 
of would-be reasons says nothing about whether such reasons exist. In response, I’m inclined to say 
 
25 Worsnip (forthcoming). 
 
26 By contrast, structural rationality is a matter of coherence among one’s attitudes. But if structural rationality is simply a 





that, if there were reasons that we can’t use in any way, then they’d be reasons of a very strange sort: 
they’d be things that determine what we should do, yet that are of no use (first-personally, 
interpersonally, and third-personally) in helping us do whatever it is that they prescribe. They couldn’t 
play the roles we need them to play. So, I think we should be parsimonious and not posit the existence 
of such reasons at all.27  
 
1.3   A Lingering Worry 
 
In light of the forgoing considerations, I take the deliberative constraint to be true. But before I 
proceed, I must field an objection to it. Markovits (2014) argues that there are cases where we seem 
to have reasons for attitudes even when we can’t base such attitudes on those reasons. She gives several 
counterexamples in attempting to show this, but given space constraints, I won’t be able to respond 
to them individually. In short, however, I think that Markovits appeals to cases where it isn’t at all 
obvious that there genuinely are the reasons she takes there to be.  
To pick just one counterexample, Markovits considers a well-known case of pragmatic reasons 
for belief. Suppose that if a sick patient were to believe that their disease is curable, then this optimism 
would make it more likely that they would recover. The fact that it will increase their odds of recovery 
seems to be a pragmatic reason for believing their disease is curable, yet (Markovits argues) this is not 
the kind of consideration a belief can be based on. So, it doesn’t seem that the patient can deliberate 
to the belief on the basis of this fact. Hence, pragmatic reasons for belief are supposed to provide 
counterexamples to the deliberative constraint. 
 






However, it’s not obvious to me that there really are pragmatic reasons for belief. Indeed, Shah 
(2006), a proponent of (something like) the deliberative constraint, uses it precisely to argue against 
pragmatic reasons for belief. Rather, Shah contends, the pragmatic advantages of believing P at most 
give one a reason to get oneself to believe P.28 Markovits’s use of the example of pragmatic reasons for 
belief is thus, at minimum, dialectically ineffective: it’s a case where proponents of the deliberative 
constraint can (and, I think, should) reject that the “reasons” at work are genuine reasons for what 
Markovits claims them to be (as opposed to reasons for something else). I suspect that my diagnosis 
of this case applies to all the others that she advances. That is, all the apparent counterexamples can 
be reframed, and the relevant intuitions can be satisfied in other ways.  
 
§2   Premise 2: Emotions and Deliberation 
 
The purpose of this section is to develop and defend premise 2, the claim that no one can deliberate 
to any emotions. Before proceeding to my argument for this claim, let’s map out the logical space of 
the relevant hypotheses.  
Let’s say an attitude is ‘unresponsive’ to deliberation just in case we can’t deliberate to (or away 
from) it. An attitude can be unresponsive along two different axes: global versus agential, and class 
versus instance. First, an attitude can be unresponsive either globally or agentially. An attitude is globally 
unresponsive iff no one can deliberate to this attitude. An attitude is agentially unresponsive iff a 
particular agent cannot deliberate to it (though perhaps others can). Second, either an entire attitudinal 
class or instances among a class could be unresponsive. An entire class is class-unresponsive iff no 
 





attitudes of this class can be deliberated to. An instance of a class is instance-unresponsive iff this 
particular instance can’t be deliberated to. 
Premise 2 is the claim that no one can deliberate to any emotion. This should be understood 
as the claim that that emotions are both globally and class-unresponsive. To arrive at this conclusion, 
I’ll first discuss, in §2.1, a few preliminaries about emotions, and then, in §2.2, I’ll introduce a 
difficulty for the claim that we can deliberate to emotions. In §2.3, I’ll show why the problem of 
recalcitrant emotions suggests that there won’t be a satisfying solution to this difficulty. Then, in §2.4, 
I’ll conclude that no one can deliberate to any emotions, because there is no deliberative question such 
that settling it consists in an emotion. 
 
2.1   Emotions 
 
It’s notoriously tough to pin down exactly what emotions are and how they should be divvied up. 
These are issues that I’ll remain mostly silent on, but I’ll just begin with a fairly straightforward 
typology of emotions. We can differentiate between emotions without an object and emotions with an 
object. Emotions without an object are emotions that aren’t directed toward anything in particular. 
These are often considered to be general moods, like depression.29 By contrast, emotions with an object 
are directed towards something. Among emotions with an object, we can further differentiate between 
emotions with propositional objects and emotions with non-propositional objects. Emotions with 
propositional objects are directed towards a proposition or state of affairs, e.g. anger that Tom stole 
from me. Emotions with propositional objects are essentially propositional attitudes; they’re an 
 





emotional attitude one takes towards a proposition. By contrast, emotions with non-propositional 
objects are not directed towards a proposition, but some other object. Common occurrences of love 
have non-propositional objects: when person X loves person Y, Y is the object of X’s love, but Y is a 
person, not a proposition. Anger can be directed at a person, too. Of course, love, like anger, can 
sometimes be a propositional attitude – e.g. X might love that Y is so kind to X – but often, the object 
of love isn’t some state of affairs and is instead a person (or animal, thing, etc.). 
 I will focus on emotions with propositional objects. This might seem to illegitimately narrow 
my scope, but this is not so. Rather, my reason for focusing on emotions with propositional objects is 
that these emotions are the best candidate for emotions that we could have reasons for. This can be 
seen clearly by contrasting emotions with no object at all: it’s not at all clear why there’d be reasons 
for general moods but not for emotions with propositional objects. Rather, emotions with 
propositional objects seem to be the best candidates, simply because other propositional attitudes (like 
beliefs) are paradigm instances of things we can have reasons for. Thus, I take emotions with 
propositional objects to be the hard case for me: if I can show that there are no reasons for emotions 
with propositional objects, then I’ll effectively have shown that there are no reasons for any emotions 
at all. 
 Beside these distinctions – emotions with no object, emotions with non-propositional objects, 
and emotions with propositional objects – matters become far trickier. The difficulty with determining 
what exactly emotions are lies in the fact that emotions are so multi-faceted: there are evaluative, 
physiological, phenomenological, expressive, behavioral, and mental dimensions that we typically 
associate with emotions (de Sousa & Scarantino, 2018). There is, then, a ‘problem of the parts’ (Prinz, 





views have dominated the philosophical literature. The first is the view that emotions are the 
phenomenological dimension: they’re raw feelings. The second is that emotions are motivations. 
They’re the behavioral and expressive dimensions. The third, which bears on the problem of 
recalcitrant emotions below, is that emotions are evaluative judgments (or some other type of evaluative 
representational state). This lattermost view is known as ‘judgmentalism’.30 This list is simplified and 
by no means exhaustive, but for present purposes, I’ll leave aside the variations of (and alternatives to) 
these views. 
 One might be tempted to think that which theory we select affects whether we can deliberate 
to our emotions. If, for instance, emotions are evaluative judgments, then surely we can deliberate to 
them. However, I think this sort of move puts the cart before the horse: instead of our theory of 
emotions informing what features we think our emotions have, we should observe the various features 
of emotions and use these to guide our theorizing about what emotions are. In fact, this is precisely 
why the problem of recalcitrant emotions is taken to be an objection to judgmentalism (see §2.3): the 
problem of recalcitrant emotions concerns a feature of emotions, namely, the possibility of their 
recalcitrance, and this feature supports the conclusion that judgmentalism is false, because, as will be 
discussed in more detail below, judgmentalism seems to be incompatible with the possibility of 
recalcitrant emotions. 
 Despite the difficulty of pinning down what emotions are, we can still say more about 
emotions. It seems true that emotions have cognitive bases. The cognitive bases of emotions are various 
beliefs (or high credences) about states of affairs that our emotions are in some sense rooted in. In 
 
30 A close cousin of judgmentalism is the view that emotions aren’t evaluative judgments, but some other type of evaluative 
representational state – say, perceptions of evaluative properties. It should be observed, though, that the problem of 
recalcitrant emotions applies uniquely to judgmentalism, but not the view that emotions are perceptions of evaluative 





order to be mad that you stole from me, I need to believe that you stole from me. My anger is directed 
toward a certain state of affairs, and I need to believe this state of affairs obtains in order to be angry 
about it. Additionally, emotions also are often accompanied by evaluative judgments.31 In addition to 
my belief that you stole from me, I also believe that this was bad.  
 Emotions can in some sense be fitting. If I know you stole from me, then being angry is a 
fitting response. What makes an emotion fitting is a matter of debate, so I’ll just offer two rough 
approximations to necessary conditions for fittingness. First, for an emotion to be fitting, its cognitive 
basis must be accurate (or, perhaps, justified). If you didn’t steal from me (or I lack reason to believe 
this), but I believe so anyway, then my anger that you stole from me isn’t fitting. Second, an emotion 
must be an appropriate and proportionate response to its cognitive basis. For example, being angry 
that you gave me a gift for my birthday is entirely inappropriate, and being angry that a casual 
acquaintance forgot my birthday is disproportionate. Both consequently seem like unfitting responses. 
By contrast, being angry that you stole from me is an appropriate and proportionate response to the 
belief that you stole from me, and so (if the belief that you stole from me is true and justified), it is 
fitting. 
 One might be puzzled that I deny that there are normative reasons for emotions yet concede 
that emotions can be fitting. Recall that fittingness-first views of normative reasons hold that reasons-
facts are explained by fittingness-facts. On a simple version of this view, a fact F is a reason for an 
attitude or action iff F makes the attitude or action fitting. It straightforwardly follows from this simple 
view and the claim that emotions can be fitting that there are normative reasons for emotions. Indeed, 
 
31 The claim that evaluative judgments often accompany emotions is non-committal. This is compatible with, though 
doesn’t entail, judgmentalism – the view that emotions are evaluative judgments. This is also compatible with the idea that 
emotions sometimes are not accompanied by evaluative judgments, or that emotions sometimes persist even after the 





many philosophers working in the philosophy of emotions think that there are normative reasons for 
emotions, and perhaps the most common strategy for arguing this is via fittingness-first views.32 
However, if we deny the simple version of the fittingness-first view – thus holding that fittingness-
facts do not (always) entail corresponding reasons-facts – then we can allow that emotions can be 
fitting without conceding that there are reasons for emotions. My view is that we should deny the 
simple version of the fittingness-first view, precisely because it commits us to the existence of reasons 
that (I will argue) fail the deliberative constraint. My view, however, is compatible with other versions 
of fittingness-first views. Strong Eliminativism merely constrains the acceptable fittingness-first views 
we can accept. Fittingness-first views need not embrace the claim that all fittingness-facts are reasons. 
There could be other conditions these fittingness-facts need to meet in order to be reasons, and the 
deliberative constraint, I think, should be one such condition. 
 
2.2   Emotions and Deliberative Questions: A General Difficulty 
 
Let’s now turn our attention to the issue of whether we can deliberate to emotions. There certainly are 
(or could be) impediments standing in the way of our ability to deliberate to emotions in some cases. 
Recall that the deliberative constraint is agent-specific and that the modal ‘can’ is one of ability. We 
can imagine that some people, due to brain abnormalities, might lack deliberative capacities entirely 
and thereby cannot deliberate to emotions. Relatedly, some people in the actual world seem to lack 
the ability to feel certain emotions. A real-life patient known as ‘SM-046’ isn’t able to feel fear due to 
 






the calcification of her amygdala, so SM-046 can’t deliberate to fear.33 Thus, given the deliberative 
constraint, people who lack deliberative capacities and patients like SM-046 lack reasons to feel 
emotions in the relevant cases. The deliberative constraint thereby entails that there aren’t reasons for 
some people, and similar considerations may extend to a perhaps significant range of cases. 
Despite these agent-specific impediments, we should ask whether in principle we can deliberate 
to emotions. It’s pretheoretically tempting to think that we can. Sometimes, I deliberate to the 
judgment that I should be afraid or that some impending situation is bad, and accordingly, I feel 
afraid. And perhaps after I discover new information, I judge that I actually have nothing to be afraid 
of, and accordingly, my fear ceases. 
However, this pretheoretically tempting line of thought doesn’t entail that we can deliberate 
to emotions.  Recall the distinction between deliberation to versus deliberation about. If one deliberates 
to an emotion, then the emotion is the direct result; if one deliberates about an emotion (but only to 
some other judgment about the emotion) and the emotion follows, then the emotion is the indirect 
result. The above line of thought only shows that emotions (and refraining from having them) 
sometimes follow a deliberation, but even when an emotion follows in the wake of a deliberation, that 
doesn’t show that one deliberated to the emotion, because it might be the case that one merely 
deliberated about the emotion. Deliberating to (or away from) an attitude is a matter of settling a 
question, the settling of which consists in the formation (or abandonment) of that attitude. Thus, to 
show that we can in principle deliberate to (or away from) emotions, we need to identify a deliberative 
question such that settling it consists in forming (or giving up) an emotion. In doxastic and practical 
deliberation, the relevant deliberation questions are easily identifiable. In the former case, the question 
 





is whether P, and in the latter, the question is whether to Φ. I settle the question whether P just in case 
I make some judgment as to whether P, and this judgment just constitutes the formation of a doxastic 
attitude. I settle the question whether to Φ just in case I decide whether or not to Φ, and this decision 
just constitutes the formation of an intention. So, I can deliberate to beliefs and intentions, simply 
because settling the relevant doxastic and practical questions consists in forming the beliefs and 
intentions being deliberated to.  
But now, let’s observe a general difficulty: what deliberative question could there be, such that 
settling it would consist in an emotion? To see why this is a difficult question, let’s consider an 
example. Suppose I’m afraid that I have to give a conference talk tomorrow. Being a pessimistic person, 
I believe, evidence to the contrary, that I’ll do poorly and, from this, that it’s bad that I have to give a 
conference talk. But (let’s suppose) I want to deliberate away from this fear. What deliberative 
questions could I ask myself? A few closely related candidates jump to mind: 
 
(a) Whether I will do poorly at this conference talk 
(b) Whether it’s bad that I have to give a conference talk 
(c) Whether I should be afraid that I have to give a conference talk 
(d) Whether giving a conference talk something to be afraid of 
 
These all seem like perfectly reasonable questions to ask myself. However, settling these questions does 
not itself seem to consist in forming any emotion. On the contrary, these all seem to be cases of doxastic 
deliberation, and settling them consists in forming the relevant beliefs: the belief that I will (not) do 





direct of these questions – namely, whether I should be afraid – seems to issue in a belief as to whether 
I should be afraid. Insofar as such questions bear on emotions, such questions seem to be cases of 
deliberation about emotions, but not quite deliberation to emotions. 
There’s one further deliberative question that jumps to mind, which might be more promising: 
 
(e) Whether to be afraid that I have to give a conference talk 
 
However, it’s not at all clear to me how to understand this deliberative question. Let’s say this is an 
instance of the schematic question whether to feel E, where E is an emotion (and ‘feel’ is construed 
broadly to include being in emotional states, e.g. being afraid). At first glance, the question whether to 
feel E may seem to be a practical deliberative question. The questions in practical deliberation take the 
form whether to Φ, and on this interpretation, the relevant Φ-ing here would just be feeling E. If (e) 
were understood this way, then settling this question would consist in an intention, rather than the 
emotion. We do sometimes form such intentions. For example, I might form the intention not to get 
angry next time someone cuts me off in traffic, or to be grateful next time my partner takes the garbage 
out. Nonetheless, in a lot of cases, something seems odd and unnatural about intending to (not) feel 
an emotion, because we don’t ordinarily take our emotions to be under our voluntary control in the 
way that actions are. Consequently, we more often ask ourselves practical questions about 
whether/how to manage our emotions – e.g. whether to go to therapy to manage my fear, whether to listen 
to music to soothe my fear. Settling these managerial questions, of course, consists in forming intentions. 
 Understanding deliberation about whether to feel E as a special case of practical deliberation 





of the question at issue in such deliberation. However, it might be suggested that deliberation about 
whether to feel E need not be understood in this way. After all, by analogy, we rarely consider 
deliberation about whether to believe P to be a special case of practical deliberation, nor do we typically 
consider answering this question to issue in an intention to (not) believe P. Rather, the question 
whether to believe P has two plausible, distinctly doxastic interpretations: the first-order whether P or 
the higher-order whether I should believe P.34 Settling either question consists in forming a belief.  
Are there clear, non-practical interpretations of the question whether to feel E analogous to 
those for the question whether to believe P? Two possible interpretations jump to mind. The first is 
that the question whether to feel E should be interpreted as the doxastic question whether I should feel 
E – the schematic form of question (c) above – the settling of which issues in a belief. The second is 
that the question whether to feel E should be interpreted as a sui generis emotional deliberative question, 
the settling of which issues in an emotion. I find the notion of a sui generis emotional deliberative 
question obscure, partly because I’m not sure how one would settle it, but I’ll address this proposal in 
the next subsection.   
 
2.3   Two Proposals and The Problem of Recalcitrant Emotions 
 
The previous subsection highlighted a general difficulty with the claim that we can deliberate to 
emotions. Simply put, the difficulty is as follows. If we can (in principle) deliberate to emotions, then 
there must be a deliberative question such that settling it consists in the formation or abandonment of 
an emotion. But any candidate for such a question either (I) seems to be a case of doxastic deliberation 
 
34 Shah (2003) and Moran (1988) both endorse the view that the question whether to believe P reduces to the first-order 





or (II) is sui generis but obscure. In response to this difficulty, my opponent can offer two 
corresponding proposals: 
 
(I*) Settling one (or more) of (a)-(d) is necessarily accompanied by an emotion in a way 
that’s sufficient to say that settling it thereby consists in forming both the relevant 
judgment and accompanying emotion.35 
(II*) (e) is a sui generis emotional deliberative question, and settling this question consists 
in forming the relevant emotion. 
 
The driving idea behind (I*) might be that I’ve construed settling questions too narrowly. Rather, so 
says my opponent, it’s sufficient for deliberating to an attitude that this attitude necessarily 
accompanies another attitude that we can deliberate to. In this subsection, I’ll grant that point, yet I’ll 
argue that discord between emotions and judgments and the related problem of recalcitrant emotions 
suggest that both (I*) and (II*) are false. 
Let’s first note two distinct but related phenomena. The first phenomenon is that there can be 
tension (or discord) between one’s emotions and judgments relevantly bearing on these emotions. This 
tension can manifest in two ways: (i) having a judgment (which positively bears on an emotion) 
without the relevant emotion; (ii) having an emotion while having a discordant judgment. To see an 
example of (i), think of a funeral attendee who just isn’t sad. They might consciously acknowledge 
 
35 There’s a corresponding version of (I*) that makes reference to practical deliberative questions instead – i.e. the proposal 
that settling some practical deliberative question is necessarily accompanied by the relevant emotion. This proposal, 
however, strikes me as obviously false, and I don’t take it to be a serious contender. Nonetheless, everything I say in this 
subsection about proposal (I*) applies equally to this corresponding proposal; that is, the problem of recalcitrant emotions 





that the situation is bad and that they should be sad, yet still fail to be sad. (Indeed, the funeral attendee 
might even become angry or disappointed with themself for not feeling sad.) This is a case of unfelt 
judgment: a judgment that bears on an emotion, yet isn’t accompanied by that emotion. To see an 
example of (ii), think of a person who’s afraid of flying despite believing that flying is neither bad nor 
dangerous. This person seems to possess a judgment at odds with the judgment that typically 
accompanies fear. In both (i) and (ii), there’s a discord between one’s emotions and judgments. This 
already casts doubt on (I*): it’s doubtful that settling the relevant doxastic questions is necessarily 
accompanied by the relevant emotions, because emotions can be in discord with these judgments (and 
vice versa). But perhaps defenders of (I*) can insist that settling the relevant doxastic questions 
necessarily effectuates changes in one’s emotional state. That is, there can be a mismatch between 
judgments and emotions, but, so say defenders of (I*), it’s sufficient to say that we can deliberate to 
emotions as long as there can’t be mismatch even after deliberating to (or away from) the relevant 
judgments: were one to arrive at the relevant judgments via deliberation, then this would necessarily 
effectuate a change in one’s emotional state, thereby bringing judgments and emotions into accord 
with one another. 
This first phenomenon is synchronic: it concerns a discord at a present moment between 
judgments and emotions. The second phenomenon is distinctively diachronic: emotions are 
sometimes recalcitrant in the face of opposing judgments. Let’s say an emotion is ‘recalcitrant’ just in 
case the emotion persists despite the subject of the emotion making a judgment that is in tension with 
the emotion. That is, an emotion is recalcitrant just in one case one previously held a judgment in 
concert with one’s emotion, and then revises this judgment, but the emotion persists. To see this, let’s 





that it’s bad that I have to give a conference talk, despite evidence to the contrary. But now suppose I 
reflect on my situation and come to believe, in light of my evidence, that giving a conference talk is 
not bad after all, that the talk will go well, and that it will be good for my career. Let’s even suppose 
that I judge that I shouldn’t be afraid. Nonetheless (let’s suppose) my fear persists despite abandoning 
the judgment(s) typically associated with fear. So, my fear is recalcitrant. 
 It’s a psychological fact that our emotions can be, and often are, recalcitrant. In my own life, 
I experience recalcitrant fear while flying. At some point in my life (probably when I was a child) I 
believed that flying was dangerous. But later on, I learned that flying is even safer than car travel. Yet, 
every time I get on an airplane, I’m afraid as soon as the plane takes off right until the plane lands. 
Sometimes I can mitigate this fear by listening to music or playing sudoku, but even then, it’s usually 
nagging at the back of my mind. God forbid we experience turbulence or fly through a storm. I’m not 
just vaguely afraid of flying – I’m afraid that the plane will crash. But at the same time, I’m fully aware 
of the relative safety of air travel, and I don’t experience the same sort of fear in cars. For all intents 
and purposes, I fully believe that flying is not dangerous!36 If I believed otherwise, I probably wouldn’t 
have flown as much as I have.  
Recalcitrance is a ubiquitous phenomenon. And not just in my own life: I suspect anyone with 
emotions knows this phenomenon all too well. Unfortunately, most recalcitrant emotions tend to be 
negative emotions. Common recalcitrant emotions are fear, anger, sadness, guilt, shame, and so on. 
These emotions are often deep-seated, unshakeable, and sometimes even the result of trauma. But this 
isn’t always the case: my fear of flying, for instance, is not rooted in trauma (or so I assume). I imagine, 
too, that good emotions could be recalcitrant; perhaps there are situations where happiness that persists 
 
36 An alternative diagnosis is that a part of me – perhaps some subconscious or instinctive part – nevertheless implicitly 





during times of extreme suffering and hardship could be said to be recalcitrant. In any case, the 
phenomenon of recalcitrant emotions is so widespread that it’s often taken to be an essential data point 
for theorizing about emotions: any theory of what emotions are must be compatible with there being 
recalcitrant emotions. If a theory can’t explain how recalcitrant emotions are possible, then this is a 
decisive reason to reject the theory. Call this the ‘problem of recalcitrant emotions’. 
D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that judgmentalism doesn’t seem to have a satisfying way 
of accommodating recalcitrant emotions. Rather, judgmentalism seems outright incompatible with 
recalcitrant emotions. To recall, judgmentalism maintains that evaluative judgments are not merely 
associated with emotions, but constitutive of the emotion itself. But, if an emotion is constituted by 
some specific evaluative judgment J, then it should be impossible for the emotion to persist even after 
J is revised. But for the very evaluative judgments that judgmentalists identify certain emotions with, 
those emotions can persist even after the relevant judgments are revised. So, D’Arms and Jacobson 
argue, judgmentalism must be false.  
Whether this is a successful argument against judgmentalism is a topic for another paper, and 
I don’t wish to rehearse the arguments for or against it any further. My purposes don’t depend on 
whether the problem of recalcitrant emotions is fatal to judgmentalism. Rather, for my purposes, the 
key point is that the recalcitrance of our emotions suggests that we can’t deliberate away from 
recalcitrant emotions. This bears crucially on proposals (I*) and (II*) above. 
The possibility of recalcitrant emotions suggests that (I*) is false. It looks like recalcitrant 
emotions can persist even after doxastic questions like (a)-(d) have been settled. I could judge that I 
won’t do poorly at the conference talk, that the conference talk will be good my career, that I shouldn’t 





making all these judgments – i.e. even after all these questions have been settled, and settled in ways 
that conflict with my fear. Therefore, settling these doxastic questions doesn’t consist (even partly) in 
forming or abandoning the accompanying emotions. 
The possibility of recalcitrant emotions also suggests that (II*) is false. It’s plausible that one’s 
fear can be recalcitrant even after the question whether to feel afraid has been settled, whatever settling 
this question amounts to. To see this, imagine that I’m asking myself this question. I look at all the 
considerations that I take to bear on it, and I believe that these considerations conclusively answer the 
question whether to feel afraid in the negative. That is, I’m fully persuaded that all these considerations 
support not being afraid. For all intents and purposes, it seems I’ve settled this question. However, it 
seems plausible that, however persuaded I am, my fear can still persist. So, settling this question doesn’t 
consist in forming or giving up the relevant emotion. 
My opponent might respond that in this case I haven’t yet settled the question; rather (my 
opponent insists) what it would be to settle the question whether to feel E just would be forming or 
giving up E. Whether to feel E is the sui generis emotional deliberative question, and in this case I’ve 
simply failed to settle it.  
However, I find this response dissatisfying. It seems true that, in being persuaded, I thereby 
settle the question. The following has to be a general condition on its being the case that the formation 
of an attitude settles a question: if the formation (or giving up) of some attitude settles some specific 
question, then one must be able to form (or give up) that attitude on the basis of the considerations 
one takes to persuasively bear on that question. Put another way, if one takes a set of considerations 
to bear on a question, and if one is all-things-considered persuaded by that set of considerations, then 





attitude. If one can’t form some attitude on the basis of the considerations that one takes to persuasively 
settle the relevant question, then the formation of that attitude can’t be what settles this question. 
Rather, this question is settled by the formation of some other attitude.  
The claim that the question whether to feel E is settled by forming emotions fails this 
constraint: for any recalcitrant emotion E, even when one finds the considerations bearing on the 
question whether to feel E fully persuasive, there’s no guarantee that one will be able to form or give 
up E, because E is recalcitrant. (My opponent thus needs to either reject this condition, in which case 
they sever a plausible rational link between settling questions and forming the requisite attitudes, or 
respond that in this case I don’t actually find the relevant considerations fully persuasive, in which case 
my opponent’s response seems ad hoc.)  
Therefore, the question whether to feel E is not the sui generis emotional deliberative question: 
settling it does not consist in forming (or giving up) the relevant emotions. Rather, settling this 
question seems to issue either in a belief or an intention. It issues in a belief when settling it amounts 
to forming beliefs about (e.g.) whether one should feel E. It issues in an intention when it’s understood 
as a practical question – either as an instance of the practical question whether to Φ or as a question 
about whether and how to manage one’s emotions. But emotions can be recalcitrant in the face of 
settling either question. So, (II*) is false. 
 
2.4   An Indirect Connection 
 
I argued in §2.3 that we can’t deliberate away from recalcitrant emotions, because there is no 





applies equally to non-recalcitrant emotions: even if emotions do sometimes follow the settling of the 
question (in non-recalcitrant cases), the settling of the question can’t constitute the forming or 
abandoning of the emotion (due to recalcitrant cases). Therefore, in settling the question, we’re not 
deliberating to (or away from) the relevant emotion even in non-recalcitrant cases. Rather, we’re 
deliberating about the emotion, and in non-recalcitrant cases forming (or refraining from having) the 
emotion follows indirectly. If my opponent grants that we can’t deliberate away from non-recalcitrant 
emotions yet insists that we can deliberate to (or away from) non-recalcitrant emotions, then they’d 
need to argue that there’s a relevant deliberative question only in the non-recalcitrant cases. But if there 
were such a question, then settling it would always consist in forming an emotion. But this applies 
equally to recalcitrant emotions: settling this question would be able to unseat recalcitrant emotions. 
So, there couldn’t be such a question only in non-recalcitrant cases; insisting that there’s such a 
question only in non-recalcitrant cases is an incoherent position. 
I therefore conclude that there is no deliberative question such that settling it consists in an 
emotion. Rather, settling all the relevant deliberative questions which bear on emotions consists in 
forming either beliefs or intentions, and the problem of recalcitrant emotions show that even after 
settling these questions, the corresponding state of emotion may not follow. I therefore conclude that 
emotions are not under our deliberative control – i.e. it’s not possible to deliberate to (or away from) 
emotions. 
My argument can be reconstructed as follows. 
 
1. The only deliberative questions we can ask ourselves with respect to emotions are (i) questions 





2. An emotion itself can be recalcitrant in the face of the results of either deliberation – either in 
the face of beliefs or in the face of intentions, each of which settles the relevant question.  
3. So even when these questions are settled, the corresponding state of emotion (or of refraining 
from having the emotion) may not follow.  
4. So, emotions can’t be the direct result of either kind of deliberation, i.e. settling these questions 
doesn’t consist in the formation of an emotion. 
5. If there is no deliberative question such that settling it consists in either forming or abandoning 
an emotion, then no one can deliberate to (or away from) emotions. 
\ Therefore, no one can deliberate to (or away from) emotions. 
 
Thus, I maintain that we can only deliberate about, rather than to, emotions. Often, our hope (perhaps 
unconsciously) is that these deliberations will change our emotions. Sometimes they do, and other 
times they don’t. But when they do, they only do so indirectly. We deliberate to a judgment that bears 
on an emotion, and this judgment is the direct result of the deliberation. This, then, leads to a change 
in one’s emotion. So, the deliberation at best indirectly led to a change in one’s emotion. The emotion 
changed via a change in belief.  
Our emotions are often sensitive (or proportional) to our judgments. This sensitivity, perhaps, 
even displays a kind of rational coherence between emotions and judgments. But this sensitivity is not 
under our rational agency, construed as a relation of deliberative control.37 Rather, though displaying 
a kind of rational coherence, the association between judgments and emotions depends on a whole 
nexus of psychological features outside of our rational agency. One possible explanation of this 
 





sensitivity is that it’s a manifestation of a disposition to be coherent. This seems plausible, but I don’t 
claim to know the whole psychological story behind this sensitivity. Nonetheless, it’s often very easy 
to feel the appropriate responses to these judgments; in a huge swath of ordinary cases, nothing stands 
in the way between our judgments and proportionally feeling emotions in response to those 
judgments. When that happens, our emotional faculties are working ‘properly’, so to speak. Suppose 
I want to determine whether Donald Trump deserves hate or pity. Here, it seems like both emotions 
are in a sense equally available to me, and which emotion I adopt simply depends on how I evaluate 
the situation. Determining this is a case of doxastic deliberation: I’m inquiring into what the world is 
like such that one or the other response is fitting. I might judge that Donald Trump is a narcissist who 
deeply craves power and the approval of others, desires which stem from deep-rooted insecurity – in 
which case, I’ll judge that pity is an appropriate response. Alternatively, I might judge that he 
unnecessarily caused irreparable harm to perhaps millions of people, which could’ve been avoided – in 
which case, I’ll judge that hate is an appropriate response. In either case, there just isn’t much standing 
in my way of feeling the emotion that’s proportional to my judgment. Most of the time, our emotional 
faculties are working so smoothly that judgments like ‘I should feel X’ don’t even have to come up. 
Rather, we often just easily feel the appropriate responses to other, less sophisticated judgments, like 
‘this is wrong’, ‘you wronged me’, ‘this is great’, and so on. 
But many other times, it’s quite hard for people to feel the appropriate responses to the various 
judgments and/or situation. Some emotions are harder to rid ourselves of than others (think of 
recalcitrant emotions). Some emotions are harder to feel than others (think of a person who wants to 
feel sad at a funeral, but just can’t). Some emotions are harder for me to feel (or rid myself of) than 





ourselves of certain emotions comes in degrees and varies across emotions, situations, and people. For 
many people who experience persistent negative emotions like shame or self-loathing, it can be so 
tough to get rid of these emotions that they determine (or are encouraged by others) that they should 
undergo psychotherapy to work through the difficulty and effectively retrain their emotional 
responses. 
In sum, sometimes a deliberation leads to a change in emotion, but this relation is indirect 
rather than direct. Our emotional faculties are working properly just in case our emotions are 
proportioned to the relevant background judgments that are associated with our emotions, yet even 
when our emotional faculties are working properly, our emotions are still not under our deliberative 
control. It’s not possible to deliberate to, or away from, emotions. 
 
§3   A Lingering Worry: Too Few Reasons 
 
I’ve now defended each premise of my argument for Strong Eliminativism. At this point, one might 
worry that Strong Eliminativism is so counterintuitive that my argument must’ve gone wrong 
somewhere. This objection can be raised along three dimensions. First, intuitively, there are reasons 
for emotions, and (it might be said) these intuitions count strongly against Strong Eliminativism. 
Second, we often speak of there being reasons for emotions, and the best explanation of this linguistic 
data is that there are reasons for emotions. This too (it might be said) counts strongly against Strong 
Eliminativism. Third, Strong Eliminativism is a sort of repugnant conclusion, and it predicts the wrong 
moral verdicts in a variety of cases. All of these are basically just forms of the well-known ‘Too Few 





take there to be, then, ceteris paribus, we should reject the theory. The Too Few Reasons objection 
has been discussed in response to a variety of theories about reasons, including moral subjectivism, 
moral error theory, and epistemic instrumentalism.38 
 Think of the jealous boyfriend. The jealous boyfriend lacks a reason to believe his partner is 
untrustworthy, and his partner continuously proves their honesty through their actions, yet the 
boyfriend gets jealous whenever his partner hangs out with one of their attractive friends. Even worse, 
the boyfriend becomes possessive and tries to undermine his partner’s agency. We can see all three 
dimensions in this example. First, intuitively, the jealous boyfriend has a reason to not be jealous (since 
his partner is trustworthy), and even should not be jealous. Second, we say in these cases ‘he shouldn’t 
be jealous’, and so on. Third, denying that he shouldn’t be jealous seems to prevent an avenue for 
criticizing his immoral behavior, and this makes Strong Eliminativism in some way repugnant. 
 I find this objection unconvincing across all three dimensions. While the Too Few Reasons 
objection holds a lot of weight in cases where we have particularly strong and salient intuitions, I don’t 
think it holds much weight otherwise. Normative reason is a tricky and highly theoretical concept. The 
ideology of normative reasons was developed by philosophers originally for reasons for action, and our 
intuitions concerning normative reasons for action are particularly strong. Our intuitions become less 
strong when we apply the framework of normative reasons to domains outside of action. In fact, I’m 
inclined to think our intuitions about reasons for belief are less strong. But when it comes to reasons 
for emotion, it just strikes me as excessively hasty to think our intuitions in these cases, provided we 
have any at all, are particularly clear or strong. Similarly, it’s hasty to think utterances like ‘you have a 
reason to be mad’ are really tracking normative reasons, rather than something else. In either case 
 





– intuitions or utterances – I’m inclined to think we can account for the relevant data without 
invoking normative reasons for emotions. To determine whether the data counts against Strong 
Eliminativism, we must ask whether our intuitions and utterances that are apparently about reasons 
for emotion are really about something else – say, fittingness. On my account, we can say that the 
boyfriend’s jealousy is unfitting. In this case, this strikes me as an acceptable way to accommodate the 
intuition or understand the utterance. Another option is to be moderately error theoretic and say that 
at face value the utterances are false, but that there are true utterances (say, about fittingness) in the 
right neighborhood of reasons-talk. Similarly, on my account, we don’t even need to do away with any 
reasons talk, just normative reasons talk. We can talk about reasons why people have certain emotions, 
why certain emotions are fitting, and so on. We can say a fact is a reason why an emotion is fitting, but 
this isn’t the same as a (normative) reason to have this emotion. I think many of the relevant 
intuitions/utterances can be captured with reasons-why-talk. Moreover, it strikes me as obvious that 
we have more than enough resources to condemn the jealous boyfriend’s action: actions can be moral 
or immoral, possessive behavior is immoral, and this doesn’t depend on there being reasons for 
emotions. So, we can condemn the boyfriend for acting on his jealousy in immoral ways. It’s not 
necessary to add a further criticism on top. Thus, I’m not sure how else my conclusion is repugnant. 




I’ve argued for the conclusion that there are no normative reasons for emotions. Though this 





For instance, we’re rarely, if ever, tempted to criticize our friends and family members on normative 
grounds for their recalcitrant emotions; when our friends are persistently afraid of flying, we don’t 
blame them. Moreover, my conclusion accords with several tenets of psychotherapy. One of the central 
tasks of cognitive behavioral therapy is to challenge emotions by challenging the undergirding beliefs, 
and the hope is that, if all goes smoothy, this in turn leads to a change in emotions. But when this 
fails, patients might need to pursue other types of therapy that are centered around re-habituation – 
e.g. somatic experiencing therapy for patients with post-traumatic stress disorder. Emotions can be 
hard to manage, and one reason why this is so is that, as I’ve argued, they’re not under our deliberative 
control. 
I also think my account can still preserve many of the intuitions that led us into thinking we 
had normative reasons for emotions in the first place. We can, after all, still praise and blame all the 
accompanying beliefs and actions on epistemic and moral grounds. We can, furthermore, talk about 
how emotions can be justified – or even reliable indicators of evaluative properties – but only at the 
cost of thinking that justification doesn’t amount to being based on reasons.   
 At bottom, I’m inclined to think that many ways we philosophers theorize about normative 
reasons tend to obscure why reasons matter to us and what roles they play in our lives. By centering 
the way that reasons figure in deliberation, we regain a sense of why reasons matter to us and what 
roles they play: reasons help us figure out what to do and, accordingly, help us assign praise and blame. 
Yet, this appears to come with certain costs: my view underpredicts the number of reasons philosophers 
have traditionally thought. But I think that, because so many discussions of reasons displaced reasons 
from these roles, philosophers hypothesized that we have reasons for a greater range of states than those 





say, preferences, desires, or even credences. It may turn out that beliefs and intentions are the only 
attitudes under our deliberative control. For some, this might just be more reason to give up the 
deliberative constraint, but I still think we should focus our normative theorizing on what we have the 
requisite control over. We seem to lack the requisite control over emotions, so I conclude that we lack 
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